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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Persistent unemployment at high levels is a central policy problem in many European
countries (see OECD 2001 for a recent overview). Among the alternative policy
proposals to reduce unemployment, tax policy shifts have received much interest. If
it should turn out that tax cuts on labour can produce major positive labour market
eﬀects, this would give politicians a much less controversial instrument than radical
changes in the institutional labour market settings.
During the last decade, the eﬀects of taxation on unemployment have been a
major research topic in public ﬁnance (see Sørensen 1997 for an overview). The
respective literature combines diﬀerent theories of equilibrium unemployment with
classical methods of tax incidence analysis. Although rigorous analytical models
provide a number of important insights, e.g. the positive impact of labour income
tax progression on employment (Hoel 1990, Lockwood and Manning 1993, Koskela
and Vilmunen 1996, Goerke 1997), their contribution to practical policy making re-
mains rather limited. The reason is that theoretical models used to investigate the
relationship between taxation and (un-)employment are highly stylised in order to
keep analytical tractability. Accounting for a more detailed production or consump-
tion structure and the speciﬁc institutional features of a country’s labour market or
tax system makes analytical solutions unavailable, thus requiring numerical solution
methods. For a quantitative assessment of the labour market impacts induced by
realistic tax policy shifts, the step from stylised analytical to complex numerical
models is inevitable. Such a transition has occurred since the early 1980s in the
ﬁelds of applied tax and trade policy analysis using computable general equilibrium
models in particular (see e.g. Shoven and Whalley 1984, Ballard et al. 1985). The
general equilibrium approach provides a comprehensive framework for studying the
eﬀects of policy interference on all markets of an economy, based rigorously on micro-
economic theory. The simultaneous explanation of income generation and spending
for all economic agents allows us to address both eﬃciency as well as distributional
eﬀects of policy changes. This is why applied general equilibrium (AGE) models
have become a standard tool for quantitative policy analysis (for surveys on the use
of AGE models in diﬀerent policy ﬁelds see e.g. Shoven and Whalley 1992, Pereira
1and Shoven 1992, Kehoe and Kehoe 1994, Fehr and Wiegard 1996, or Weyant 1999).
To date, however, little work has been done to incorporate unemployment fea-
tures within the applied general equilibrium framework, even though labour market
eﬀects of policy interference have become a key interest to decision-makers. A com-
mon ad hoc modelling approach is to replace the competitive labour market of a
standard general equilibrium setting with a “wage curve” (Blanchﬂower and Oswald
1994). The wage curve reﬂects empirical evidence on the inverse relationship between
the level of wages and the rate of unemployment. In such a model, the wage curve,
together with labour demand, determines the level of involuntary unemployment
(see e.g. Böhringer et al. (2003)). The wage curve constitutes a convenient short-
cut to incorporate unemployment, but it lacks an explicit micro-foundation. This
makes it impossible to analyse how speciﬁc policy measures aﬀect the wage setting
mechanism.
In order to track down the causal chain from policy interference to labour market
eﬀects one must open the “black box” of the wage curve and explicitly model the
wage-setting process. Concrete examples include the eﬃciency-wage model provided
by Hutton and Ruocco (1999) for selected EU countries and MIMIC, a detailed
model of the Dutch labour market (Bovenberg et al. 2000, Graaﬂand et al. 2001), in
which wages are determined by centralised collective bargaining between ﬁrms and
trade unions. In the MIMIC model, the wage bargaining equation contains economy-
wide averages of the bargaining power, output and labour demand elasticities and,
therefore, largely neglects sector-speciﬁc characteristics.
Here, we present an AGE modelling approach to incorporate sectoral wage bar-
gaining which is relevant for various OECD countries including Germany, Spain, or
Sweden (see EIRO, 2002): Wages are determined through ﬁrm-union bargaining at
the sectoral level. Diﬀerent economic conditions across sectors then produce diﬀer-
ent bargaining settings with varying bargaining power for ﬁrms and unions, making
wage negotiations sensitive to the speciﬁcc o n d i t i o n si ne a c hs e c t o r .
From a methodological point of view our model feature of sectoral heterogeneity
in wage bargaining provides an innovative contribution to the AGE literature. From
the viewpoint of policy analysis, illustrative simulations for Germany indicate that
cuts in labour taxes can make only a small contribution to alleviating the problem
2of persistent unemployment. Given the rather small impacts of tax policy changes,
the ranking of the diﬀerent tax instruments in terms of output and employment is
rather robust and can mainly traced back to changes in the progressivity of the wage
income tax system. However, the welfare consequences for workers and capitalists
can diﬀer substantially with varying assumptions on capital mobility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the al-
gebraic model structure and lays out in detail how sectoral wage bargaining can be
incorporated into the general equilibrium framework. Section 3 provides illustrative
simulations of labour tax policies for Germany. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2M o d e l D e s c r i p t i o n
We present a detailed algebraic description of a static multi-sector general equi-
librium model for an open economy. The innovative feature of our model is the
incorporation of decentralised wage bargaining. In each sector, an employers’ organ-
isation and a labour union are engaged in wage negotiations, which are modelled as
a “right-to-manage” Nash-bargaining. We assume that the bargaining parties have
rational expectations about the labour demand outcome. For each sector, an indi-
vidual wage equation with speciﬁc bargaining parameters is set up and calibrated,
taking into account empirical wage diﬀerentials between sectors. Workers are classi-
ﬁed into two skill types. They are mobile, but they can only change sectors during




In each production sector, a representative ﬁrm produces a homogenous output. We
use a nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production function to reﬂect
3Figure 1: Nesting structure of production function
empirical evidence on the substitution possibilities. Figure 1 provides a diagram-
matic overview of the nesting structure.
In the top nest, a material composite () is combined in ﬁxed proportions with
aggregate value added ().  consists of intermediate inputs with ﬁxed coeﬃcients
(Leontief production structure), whereas  consists of low-skilled labour ()a n d
a composite of high-skilled labour () and capital (), trading oﬀ at a constant
elasticity of substitution. The nesting reﬂects empirical evidence that  is a relatively
good substitute for both  and  whereas  and  are relatively bad substitutes
for each other. Adopting the calibrated share form (see Appendix I), the cost function
























































































 := benchmark value share of  in  aggregate,
 := wage of skill group  (gross of wage tax),
 := rental rate of capital,
 := price of Armington good 
 := ﬁxed quantity of Armington good 

 := elasticity of substitution in nest,

 := elasticity of substitution in  nest,
	 := social security contributions of labour of type 
 := capital input tax,
and the “bar” superscript denotes benchmark values.
Each individual ﬁrm is assumed to be small in relation to its respective sector.
All ﬁrms in one sector interact through monopolistic competition, i.e. they produce
individual variants of the sectoral output good, which attract diﬀerent consumers.
This means that ﬁrms can exploit market power in their respective market segment.
Producer output prices then consist of costs (of the three primary inputs as well as
intermediary inputs) plus a ﬁxed mark-up. The budget constraint of the represen-
tative ﬁrm reads
(1 − ) =
X

 + (1 + ) +
X

(1 + 	) (5)
where
 := price mark-up rate,
 := output price,
 := output quantity,
 := intermediary input from Armington good 
 := capital input,
 := labour input of skill type 
5Proﬁts in sector  are given by
 =  (6)
2.1.2 Factor Demand






















































































 := value share of labour skill type  in total production costs,
 := price mark-up (reciprocal of the output demand elasticity).
Note that the terms on the RHS containing the ’s are the compensated labour
demand elasticities; the last term in each expression accounts for the output vari-
ation. (For the relation between compensated and uncompensated elasticities, see
e.g. Hamermesh 1993, pp. 22-38.)
Capital and labour are mobile across sectors (see Section 2.3.2 for the repre-
sentation of intersectoral labour mobility in the presence of cross-sector wage dif-
ferentials). The market for capital is perfectly competitive. In our central model
variant, we assume that capital is internationally immobile, which reﬂects a short-
to medium-run model horizon. Sensitivity analysis of policy intervention with re-
spect to international capital mobility will be performed in Section 3.2.
6Figure 2: Utility nesting of representative worker
2.2 Private Households
The household sector is diﬀerentiated into three representative households, two
worker households and one capitalist household. For both skill groups, there is one
worker household that receives both labour income and unemployment beneﬁts. The
latter is proportional to the time spent unemployed with the replacement rate ﬁxed
at a constant fraction of the net wage. The worker households may also receive
af r a c t i o no ft h ec a p i t a l( ) and proﬁti n c o m e( ). The third household is only
endowed with capital and property rights of the ﬁrms. If  =  =0(which is
our default setting), the functional distribution of incomes is clear-cut. If the worker
households receive part of the capital and proﬁt incomes, we assume that it is distrib-
uted between them in proportion to their empirical benchmark savings. In addition
to the factor incomes, there is either a lump-sum tax or a transfer to balance the
government’s budget (see Section 2.4).
The CES utility function of workers is illustrated in Figure 2.
At the top level, households decide over current versus future consumption, i.e.
. “Current utility”  is an aggregate of leisure () and the consumption good
composite (). The capitalist household does not supply labour, so “current utility”
is conﬁned to the consumption good composite.
72.2.1 Savings and Investment
The representation of the savings decision follows the approach of Ballard et al.
(1985). They derive a savings function in which savings are sensitive to both the
real interest rate and the price of investment goods. The households’ savings then
correspond to the purchase of a uniform investment good at price   per unit. This
investment good is a ﬁxed-coeﬃcient composite of all Armington goods (see Section
2.5). Households derive their utility from the future stream of consumption that
corresponds to the return to investment. In formal terms, the households’ trade-oﬀ




 ) s.t.   +  

 = " (10)
where
 := current utility aggregate,

 := stream of future consumption,
  := price of 
  := price of 
 
" := extended income, see (16).
The crucial point in the savings calculus is the determination of   which is the
key determinant of savings demand. Each unit of investment (savings), , generates
as t r e a mo f# units of capital services in each future period (where # is a constant
determined by the steady state condition). These services yield yearly income at rate
 (net of taxes), which is then traded for the consumption goods composite at rate
  (note that   is not diﬀerentiated across households, because all households are
assumed to have the same consumption spending pattern). For static expectations,
i.e. households expect all prices to remain at their current levels, savings will yield






Together with the price   of the investment good, which is deﬁned as Leontief







































 denoting the value share of current consumption in extended income. The



























This yields the following savings demand function:
 = ¯ 
µ
  ¯  
¯   
¶

 " ¯  
¯ " 
 (15)
It is important to note that the assumption of a ﬂexible savings price drives a wedge
between the amount of money actually spent on investment goods and the savings
term appearing in the utility maximising problem, because   generally does not
equal  . In order to assure that the households’ budget constraints actually hold
(i.e. outlays equal income), we must correct for the diﬀerence between   and  .




˜  + $ +  +  ¯  + Π +(   −  ) − % (16)
where
˜  := net wage rate,
$ := unemployment beneﬁt,
 := value of unemployed time,
¯  := aggregated capital stock,
Π := aggregated proﬁts,
% := lump-sum tax or beneﬁt (see Section 2.4).
Equation (16) forms the basis for the benchmark value shares 

 . The savings deci-
sion of the capitalist household is derived analogously.
92.2.2 Labour Supply
On the second level of the utility maximisation problem, households decide about
leisure and current consumption. Time endowment is divided into three components:
leisure, labour time, and time spent unemployed (searching for a job). Labour time






 := labour demand by sector.
Unemployed time in the benchmark is calculated as
 = &(1 − &) (18)
where
& := benchmark unemployment
(as a fraction of total labour supply  =  + ).
Leisure (), as the third component of total time endowment, is calculated as
 =( ' − 1) (19)
where
' := ratio of total time endowment to labour supplied.
Thus, total labour endowment ¯  can be written as
¯  =  +  +  (20)
A key assumption about the households’ labour supply behaviour in our modelling
approach is that workers cannot directly enter employment. Each additional unit
of labour is ﬁrst unemployed for a certain period and may then be combined with
a job according to a stochastic matching process (see Section 2.3.2). Consequently,
the marginal decision of each household depends only on the annualised value of
10unemployed time,  However, the inframarginal units of labour receive the net
of tax wage ˜  when employed in sector ,o r$ when unemployed ($ can be chosen
to be either ﬁxed in absolute terms or as a fraction of the net wage). The net wage
is derived from the gross wage by imposing a linear progressive wage tax:
˜  =  − ( − ) (21)
where:
 := marginal tax rate,
 := allowable tax deduction.





































































































 := benchmark value share of consumption in the value of current utility.
2.2.3 Consumption
Aggregate consumption for each of the two representative worker households is de-
termined together with labour supply. As we assume identical consumption spending




 +  (26)
where
 := aggregate consumption/supply of aggregate consumption good,
 := consumption of worker household 
 := consumption of capitalist household.
Aggregate consumption is then distributed among the diﬀerent consumption goods,































  := consumer price index,


 := benchmark value share of consumption good (
 := producer price of consumption good (
 := consumption tax,
 := elasticity of substitution in consumption,
 := consumption of good (
 := aggregate consumption.










 =  (30)
122.3 Labour Market
2.3.1 Wage Bargaining
Wages are determined by sector-speciﬁc bargaining between the representative ﬁrm
and a trade union. As is usual in the trade union literature, we represent the bar-
gaining outcome as the maximisation of a Nash function that includes the objective
functions of both parties and their respective fallback options. We adopt the “right
to manage” approach: parties bargain over wages, and ﬁrms decide over their labour
demand at the bargained wage.




lnΩ =l n + )lnΓ + ) lnΓ (31)
where
Ω := Nash maximand,
 := proﬁts of representative ﬁrm,
Γ := union utility of workers of type 
) := bargaining power of high-skilled labour,
) := bargaining power of low-skilled labour.
The ﬁrms’ objective is their proﬁt, . We assume that the ﬁrms’ fallback option
is not to produce and, thus, make zero proﬁt s .T h eu n i o nr e p r e s e n t sb o t ht y p e so f
workers. For each skill type, its objective function is employment times the value of
a job minus the value of unemployment:
Γ =  ( − )
For a more detailed explanation of the term  −  see Section 2.3.2.
Maximising the Nash objective (31) yields one ﬁrst order condition (FOC) for
















13We use uncompensated own- and cross-price labour demand elasticities,  to write
down the FOC in a compact form. Both bargaining parties know that ﬁrms will in-
crease their output price when wages rise, leading to a fall in output. Note that in
collective bargaining, the relevant output price elasticity is the elasticity of industry
output, not the individual ﬁrm’s output. The nesting structure of both production
and consumption requires a numerical approximation of the relevant price elastici-
ties. We calculate the latter at the benchmark point and use these values as para-
meters in subsequent policy counterfactuals. (The documentation of the numerical
routine can be obtained from the authors upon request.) In our policy simulations,
re-calculation of elasticities in the counterfactual equilibrium justiﬁes this procedure
because the deviations from the benchmark values are negligible.















For high-skilled labour, the FOC is derived analogously. (Taxes are explained in
Section 2.4.)
2.3.2 Intersectoral Mobility and Wage Arbitrage
As is common in the literature on search unemployment (see e.g. Pissarides, 1990),
we use value functions to characterize the surplus from working. The value of a job




[˜  +( 1− +)+1 + ++1] (34)
(we drop the skill index in this section), where
 := discount rate,
˜  := after-tax wage,
+ := separation rate.




[$ +( 1− ,)+1 + ,+1] (35)
14where
$ := unemployment beneﬁt,
, := hiring rate.
While unemployed, a worker receives a beneﬁt that does not depend on former
earnings. (But it can be indexed to the net wage in general and take on the form of
a ﬁxed replacement rate.)
A steady state is characterised by
 = +1 and  = +1 (36)
which allows us to drop the time index and rewrite the value of the state of unem-
ployment as
 = $ + ,( − ) ∀ (37)
In equilibrium, job-seekers must be indiﬀerent between any two of the sectors, i.e.
,( − )=,( − ) ∀ (38)
The higher the “surplus from working” ( − )i s ,t h el o w e rt h eq u i tr a t ef r o m
unemployment, , must be (see Acemoglu 2001, p. 18: “Workers who apply to bad
jobs suﬀer shorter unemployment spells”). This condition reﬂects empirical evidence
that high-wage jobs actually attract longer queues (Holzer et al. 1991).
In a steady state, there must be a ﬂow equilibrium on the labour market, i.e.
lay-oﬀs equal hirings:
+ (1 − &)=,& (39)
where & is the sectoral unemployment rate. This allows the elimination of , from
the value functions:
, =
+ (1 − &)
&
 (40)
We assume each single sector to be small compared to the aggregate economy, i.e.
the bargaining parties treat the macro variables as given. In particular, the value
of unemployment is constant from each union’s point of view. We can thus replace
 −  in the Nash maximand with
 −  =
˜  − 
 + +
 (41)
15which results in a function where ˜  is the only remaining variable. The diﬀerentia-
tion of the rearranged Nash objective yields the FOC for low-skilled and high-skilled
l a b o u ra sg i v e ni n( 3 3 ) .
2.4 Government
The government levies the following taxes to collect revenues:
	 := social security contributions of labour (payroll tax),
 := capital input tax,
 := proﬁtt a x ,
 := allowable tax deduction,
 := marginal tax rate on labour income,
 := consumption tax,
 := output tax.

























$ + ./0  = % + ¯ % (42)
where
- := government purchases in sector 
. := foreign exchange rate,
/0  := exogenous balance of payment deﬁcit (or surplus, if negative),
¯ % := lump sum tax (or transfer, if negative) to balance the budget.
The value of ¯ % is calibrated to assure the government’s budget constraint in the
benchmark. ¯ % is then distributed among the three households in proportion to
their monetary incomes
162.5 Foreign Trade
Domestically produced goods are converted through a constant elasticity of transfor-
mation (CET) function into speciﬁc goods destined for the domestic market and






























with an associated price equation
(1 + )





















1 := good produced for the domestic market,
2. := goods produced for the export market,

 
 := value share of domestic consumption in domestic production,

!"
 := value share of exports,
# := price of 1
!" := export prices,
 := elasticity of transformation,
. := foreign exchange rate.
Following the small open economy assumption, export and import prices in foreign
currency are not aﬀected by the behaviour of the domestic economy. In other words,
the small open economy faces inﬁnitely elastic world export demand and world
import supply functions.
Analogously to the export side, we adopt the Armington assumption of product
heterogeneity for the import side. A CES function characterises the choice between



























































 := Armington good,

 
 := value share of domestic production in domestic consumption,

%
 := value share of imports,
" := Imports,

 := elasticity of substitution,
 := price of Armington good,
 := import prices (ﬁxed in foreign currency).










 := derived Armington demand from private consumption,
- := government consumption,
" := investment demand,
 := intermediate demand from sector 



















































The ﬂexible exchange rate, ., adjusts so as to leave the benchmark balance of pay-
ments deﬁcit (or surplus), /0 , unchanged in terms of world market prices.
183 Policy Simulations
We use our model to investigate the labour market eﬀects of stylised tax policy re-
forms for Germany, an economy that features decentralized sectoral wage bargaining.
Before we can perform quantitative analysis, the free parameters of the functional
forms must be determined. As is customary in applied general equilibrium analy-
sis, the model is based on economic transactions in a particular benchmark year.
Benchmark quantities and prices — together with exogenous elasticities — are used
to calibrate the functional forms. Appendix II provides a detailed description of the
data sources and the calibration procedure.
Our policy scenarios are designed to provide a straightforward comparison of four
tax instruments that are repeatedly addressed in the policy debate on tax reforms.
Three of these instruments directly aﬀect the cost of labour: (1) the payroll tax
(scenario 	), (2) the marginal labour income tax (scenario ), and (3) the tax
allowance (scenario ). As a fourth instrument, we consider the consumption tax
(scenario ).
Across all scenarios, we impose revenue-neutrality in the sense that the provi-
sion of the public goods is kept constant at the benchmark level. Constant public
good provision together with the assumption of separability between private and
public good consumption provides a common approach to avoid measurement prob-
lems with respect to the beneﬁts from public good consumption. Cutbacks in labour
or consumption taxes are compensated by an increase of lump-sum transfers from
households to the government. The compensating transfers are distributed propor-
tionally to the benchmark household incomes (whose benchmark shares in total
income are 46% for capital owners, 48% for high skilled workers and 6% for low
skilled workers). The comparability of results across the scenarios is warranted be-
cause we maintain this (somewhat arbitrary) distribution of lump-sum transfers
and implement a uniform increase in the overall lump-sum transfer (two percent of
the total benchmark public budget), while the additional public revenue is recycled
through a reduction of each of the four taxes that we consider.
In Section 3.1, we discuss the results of our four central scenarios. In Section 3.2,
we check the robustness of our results with respect to changes in two key assump-
19tions: (1) ﬁxed absolute real unemployment beneﬁt si n s t e a do faﬁxed replacement
rate and (2) internationally mobile capital instead of a domestically ﬁxed capital
stock.
3.1 Main Scenarios
Tables 1 and 2 summarise the impacts of the simulated tax policy reforms on central
economic indicators. The simulation results are reported in percentage change from
benchmark values, except for the indicators unemployment and tax parameters,
whose changes are reported in percentage points. Table 1 refers to a situation in
which labour supply is ﬁxed at the benchmark value, whereas Table 2 is based
on the assumption of elastic labour supply (with an uncompensated labour supply
elasticity amounting to 0.15 for both worker households (see Borjas 2000, p. 47)). A
comparison of Tables 1 and 2 then allows us to isolate the eﬀects of tax parameter
changes in the wage bargaining system independent of general equilibrium labour
supply reactions.
For the interpretation of results, it is crucial to consider how the wage tax pa-
rameters aﬀect the progression of labour income taxation. With " denoting wage
income of the worker household, the average tax rate of the linear-progressive tax





The degree of tax progression is measured by the coeﬃcient of residual income
progression (“3" ”), which is deﬁned as (1−)(1−). In the case of propor-
tional taxation,  is zero and  equals  yielding a 3"  =1 , i.e. a situation
without progression. With a positive tax allowance, the labour income tax schedule
becomes progressive, and the degree of progressivity rises (i.e. the 3"  decreases)
the higher the tax allowance is. As with ,c u t si n have a direct eﬀect on tax
progression: If the marginal tax rate is cut, the 3"  increases (for 40), i.e.
the tax schedule becomes less progressive. The payroll tax (	), in contrast, only has
an indirect eﬀect on tax progression through variations of the wage income. This
20indirect income eﬀect, which is also present in the cases of , ,a n d turns out
to be negligible in the numerical simulations.
Instrument 	   
GDP -0.02 -0.13 0.15 -0.02
Consumption 0.29 0.37 0.15 0.14
Investment -0.77 -1.43 0.31 -0.39
Welfare (L) 0.65 0.40 0.08 0.31
Welfare (H) 0.60 0.90 0.23 0.29
Welfare (K) -0.78 -1.35 0.17 -0.38
Employment (L) -0.03 -0.22 0.31 -0.03
Employment (H) -0.02 -0.17 0.21 -0.02
Unemployment (L) 0.02 0.19 -0.26 0.02
Unemployment (H) 0.02 0.15 -0.19 0.02
Interest rate 0.03 -0.61 1.08 1.18
Producer wage (L) -0.03 0.25 -0.52 0.01
Producer wage (H) -0.02 0.39 -0.70 0.01
Consumer wage (L) 1.64 2.27 -0.52 1.21
Consumer wage (H) 1.65 3.16 -0.70 1.22
Tax parameter change (L) -2.03 -1.55 4.91 -1.19
Tax parameter change (H) -2.03 -1.96 4.76 -1.19
Table 1: Changes in Macroeconomic Variables (Fixed Labour Supply)
When the payroll tax 	 is lowered, the tax progressivity (measured as the
3" ) remains virtually unchanged. One might expect a reduction in the tax wedge
between the producer wage and the consumer wage to result in a symmetrical move-
ment of these two wages. However, in a model with a ﬁxed replacement rate, the
reaction is asymmetrical: The adjustment takes place through the net wage, whereas
the gross wage remains nearly unchanged. The reason for this is that — given a ﬁxed
replacement rate — the outside option of the trade union moves in proportion to the
bargained wage. The bargaining ﬁrst-order condition can only hold with (nearly)
constant unemployment and thus with a constant producer wage (Pissarides 1998,
p.157). In essence, all policy changes that “do not aﬀect the diﬀerence between the
21after-tax wage income and the after-tax unemployment income” (i.e. the outside
option) will have no eﬀect on wage formation (Koskela 2001, p.12).
The increase in consumer wages more than oﬀsets the reduction in lump-sum
transfers for the worker households, which implies an increase in real income (wel-
fare) for workers. On the other hand, capitalists suﬀer welfare losses since the in-
crease in their factor income is not high enough to compensate their expenditure for
the additional lump-sum transfers (the change in the interest rate is negligible). As
capitalists have a higher savings ratio than workers, the income redistribution from
capitalists to workers translates into a shift from investment to consumption.
When the marginal wage tax rate  is lowered, tax progressivity declines. It
becomes more attractive for the trade unions to bargain for higher wages instead
of more employment. Consequently, the producer wages go up, generating lower
employment (higher unemployment) and less overall economic activity (measured
as GDP). Although the tax base of the wage tax is smaller than that of the payroll
tax because of the tax allowance, the tax cut is smaller in terms of tax rate changes
(1.55 and 1.96 percentage points vis-à-vis 2.03 percentage points, respectively). This
is because the tax rate change leads to contraction of all tax bases in the economy.
Similar to the payroll tax scenario, we have functional redistribution from capitalists
to workers.
When the wage income tax allowance  is used to compensate for the exoge-
nous increase in lump-sum transfers, the allowance must be increased by about 4.5
percentage points of the benchmark wage income. The wage income tax schedule
then becomes more progressive, which triggers labour market eﬀects that are inverse
to the case where  is cut. The producer wage goes down, leading to higher employ-
ment and lower unemployment. Again, the representative worker households beneﬁt
directly from the tax reform, but now this is not through a higher consumer wage,
but through higher disposable income in spite of a lower consumer wage. Contrary
to the other two labour tax scenarios, in the case of the wage tax allowance, the
capitalists gain as well, because the increase in the interest rate more than oﬀsets
their higher lump-sum transfers to the government. Consequently, the redistributive
eﬀects are considerably smaller than in the other scenarios 	.and .
When the consumption tax is lowered, the results are very similar to the payroll
22tax scenario. This is not surprising, because these two taxes are nearly equivalent
in a model setting where future consumption depends on static consumer price
expectations. Yet, compared to the payroll tax scenario, the redistributive eﬀect
is less pronounced because capital owners directly beneﬁt from the consumption
tax cut, whereas this is not the case with the payroll tax. The increase of the real
interest rate reﬂects the decrease in consumer prices (the consumer price index
serves as numéraire). The cut in consumption taxes in Table 1 is reported as a
uniform decrease in the tax factor 1+ Consumption tax rates are non-uniform
across consumption goods in the benchmark, and we have chosen a proportional
downscaling of the tax factor in order to preserve the consumption tax structure.
Instrument 	   
GDP 0.19 0.11 0.32 0.17
Consumption 0.10 0.16 -0.01 -0.02
Investment 0.62 0.12 1.44 0.81
Welfare (L) 0.08 -0.08 -0.24 -0.10
Welfare (H) -0.14 0.01 -0.32 -0.28
Welfare (K) 0.44 0.00 1.16 0.66
Employment (L) 0.33 0.14 0.58 0.29
Employment (H) 0.28 0.17 0.46 0.25
Unemployment (L) -0.01 0.13 -0.27 -0.01
Unemployment (H) 0.01 0.13 -0.19 0.00
Interest rate 1.33 0.84 2.13 2.24
Producer wage (L) -0.54 -0.28 -0.90 -0.45
Producer wage (H) -0.84 0.53 -1.36 -0.71
Consumer wage (L) 0.96 1.55 -0.92 0.65
Consumer wage (H) 0.65 1.97 -1.38 0.38
Tax parameter change (L) -1.85 -1.42 4.70 -1.10
Tax parameter change (H) -1.85 -1.80 4.69 -1.10
Table 2: Changes in Macroeconomic Variables (Flexible Labour Supply)
We now turn to the implications of ﬂexible labour supply as captured in Table 2.
In general, we can observe that unemployment rates are hardly aﬀected by whether
23labour supply is ﬂexible or ﬁxed. This conﬁrms economic intuition for a wage bar-
gaining framework with a ﬁxed replacement rate where — in the simplest analytical
case — the rate of unemployment is solely determined through the CRIP and the re-
placement rate (Boeters, 2002). However, the employment level diﬀers considerably
between the cases with ﬁxed and ﬂexible labour supply. Compared with Table 1,
there is an additional expansionary labour supply eﬀect in Table 2, which translates
into higher output across all four tax reform scenarios. This eﬀe c tc a n n o tb et r a c e d
back to one single source but is the result of overlapping price and income eﬀects.
On the one hand, there is a price eﬀect due to the higher value of searching for work
(through a higher consumption wage or a higher tax allowance on labour income)
a n da ni n c o m ee ﬀect due to the higher lump-sum transfer to the government, both
of which work towards higher labour supply. On the other hand, there is an opposite
income eﬀect due to the higher consumption wage. Observing higher employment
i nt h ec a s ew i t hﬂexible labour supply than with ﬁxed labour supply, we can infer
that the former eﬀects dominate the labour supply decision. Higher labour supply
at a constant unemployment rate then translates into higher capital productivity
and a higher interest rate. Capital owners are therefore better oﬀ in all scenarios
in Table 2 than in Table 1. (Note that the welfare of worker households cannot be
compared between Tables 1 and 2, because leisure enters the welfare determination
with ﬂexible labour supply, whereas it does not with ﬁxed labour supply.)
In summary, the results from our stylised policy scenarios suggest that tax policy
shifts do not provide a strong lever for alleviating of the unemployment problem.
3.2 Sensitivity Analysis
For our main scenarios in Section 3.1 we have assumed that (1) unemployment ben-
eﬁta r eg i v e na saﬁxed replacement rate of the disposable income of the employed
workers and (2) capital can not move across domestic borders. In this section, we ex-
plore the robustness of our results with respect to plausible alternative assumptions
on the institutional setting for unemployment beneﬁts and capital mobility.
Table 3 summarizes results generated under the assumption that the unemploy-
ment beneﬁti sﬁxed in absolute, real terms rather than by a constant replace-
24ment rate (labour supply is ﬂexible, so Table 3 must be compared to Table 2).
Across all tax instruments, the alternative determination of the unemployment ben-
eﬁt generates an expansive eﬀect with lower unemployment, higher employment and
higher output. When tax reforms tend to produce a higher disposable labour income
(through an increase in the consumer wage or through a higher tax allowance), the
unemployed are worse oﬀ when they cannot participate in this income increase
through an adjustment of their unemployment beneﬁts. This in turn produces a
downward pressure on the bargained wage, because it becomes relatively more at-
tractive for the trade union to negotiate for higher employment instead of higher
wages. As a consequence, the bargained wages and unemployment in this setting are
l o w e rt h a nw i t haﬁxed replacement rate.
Instrument 	   
GDP 0.28 0.22 0.36 0.22
Consumption 0.03 0.07 -0.04 -0.07
Investment 1.18 0.84 1.69 1.14
Welfare (L) -0.10 -0.22 -0.31 -0.22
Welfare (H) -0.26 -0.16 -0.37 -0.35
Welfare (K) 0.93 0.64 1.38 0.95
Employment (L) 0.63 0.39 0.69 0.49
Employment (H) 0.39 0.32 0.51 0.30
Unemployment (L) -0.31 -0.11 -0.39 -0.20
Unemployment (H) -0.12 -0.05 -0.25 -0.07
Interest rate 1.85 1.51 2.36 2.59
Producer wage (L) -0.95 -0.61 -1.06 -0.71
Producer wage (H) -1.15 -0.95 -1.50 -0.88
Consumer wage (L) 0.64 1.36 -1.08 0.42
Consumer wage (H) 0.44 1.76 -1.52 0.25
Tax parameter change (L) -1.98 -1.55 4.86 -1.14
Tax parameter change (H) -1.98 -1.96 4.89 -1.14
Table 3: Changes in Macroeconomic Variables (Fixed Real Unemployment Beneﬁts)
The welfare level of the representative worker households in Table 3 is lower
25than in Table 2 for all tax reform scenarios. This means that the positive income
eﬀect through higher employment is more than oﬀset by the negative income eﬀects
through a lower wage and lower unemployment beneﬁts. With respect to functional
income distribution, granting unemployment beneﬁts in ﬁxed absolute real terms
rather than linking it to a constant replacement rate triggers a redistributional
eﬀect from workers to capital owners. Overall, the ranking of the three labour tax
instruments in terms of output, employment and unemployment remains the same
as in Table 2 (whereas the eﬀects of  now come closer to those of  than of 	).
Table 4 summarizes the results for the assumption of internationally mobile
capital (while the unemployment beneﬁt is — by default — determined through a
ﬁxed replacement rate). The international capital price is ﬁx e da tt h el e v e lo ft h e
exchange rate, so that the entries in row “Interest rate” of Table 4 reﬂect the relative
movement of the exchange rate to the consumption price index. The domestic capital
stock is now adjusted by capital inﬂows or outﬂows such that its marginal product
equals the exogenous international price of capital. Since we observe an increase in
the domestic interest rate for all scenarios with a ﬁxed capital stock (Table 2), this
translates into capital inﬂows for the case of capital mobility.
Compared to Table 2, Table 4 generally features higher output levels which are
triggered by additional capital inﬂows from abroad. More capital leads to higher
labour productivity which translates into higher wages. International capital mobil-
ity, thus, induces strong income redistribution from capitalists to workers. Domestic
capital owners cannot — as with a ﬁxed capital stock — beneﬁt from an increase in the
real interest rate; their factor income remains roughly constant, but they suﬀer on
the expenditure side from the increase in the lump-sum transfer to the government.
Workers, on the other hand, are more than compensated through higher wages.
In terms of output and employment, the ranking among the diﬀerent tax in-
struments remains stable. The wage income tax allowance performs best, and the
marginal tax rate ranks last; the payroll tax together with the consumption tax is
in-between. However, in terms of tax policy incidence, the ranking of tax instruments
changes when we alter the assumption about capital mobility. The wage income tax
allowance is the worst scenario for the worker households under capital immobility,
whereas it is the best possible outcome under international capital mobility. Cap-
26Instrument 	   
GDP 0.35 0.20 0.67 0.30
Consumption 0.74 0.56 1.12 0.48
Investment -0.66 -0.72 -0.53 -0.20
Welfare (L) 0.65 0.24 0.68 0.34
Welfare (H) 0.57 0.46 0.90 0.27
Welfare (K) -0.67 -0.73 -0.55 -0.21
Employment (L) 0.33 0.12 0.69 0.28
Employment (H) 0.34 0.19 0.66 0.29
Unemployment (L) 0.08 0.21 -0.22 0.07
Unemployment (H) 0.06 0.18 -0.18 0.05
Interest rate 0.10 0.03 0.24 1.42
Producer wage (L) 0.02 0.10 -0.05 0.02
Producer wage (H) -0.06 -0.02 -0.17 -0.05
Consumer wage (L) 1.91 2.20 -0.04 1.36
Consumer wage (H) 1.84 2.87 -0.15 1.29
Tax parameter change (L) -2.30 -1.62 6.29 -1.32
Tax parameter change (H) -2.30 -2.06 6.04 -1.32
Table 4: Changes in Macroeconomic Variables (Mobile Capital)
ital owners, by contrast, are best oﬀ with an adjustment of the wage income tax
allowance under immobile capital, whereas their preferred instrument under capital
mobility is the consumption tax.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
High taxes on labour combined with institutional rigidities of the labour market are
often held responsible for substantial structural unemployment in various OECD
countries. In this vein, cuts in labour taxes are considered as a potentially important
policy measure to alleviate the unemployment problem. In this paper, we developed
an applied general equilibrium model that allows us to assess the quantitative ef-
27fects of tax policy shifts in economies featuring decentralised wage bargaining. A
distinctive and innovative feature of our model is the sectoral heterogeneity in wage
bargaining between employers’ associations and trade unions that represent workers
of two skill groups with diﬀerent bargaining power. Illustrative policy simulations
for Germany show that the reduction in unemployment that can be achieved by
tax reforms is rather moderate. Labour market eﬀects can mainly be traced back to
changes in the tax progression.
Sensitivity analysis with respect to assumptions on the institutional setting for
unemployment beneﬁts and on capital mobility shows that the ranking of tax policy
instruments in terms of output and employment remains stable. Regarding welfare,
the ranking is rather robust with respect to the institutional setting for the unem-
ployment beneﬁts, but it is highly sensitive to the assumption on capital mobility.
With internationally mobile capital, workers can substantially beneﬁt from capital
imports through higher wages, whereas capitalists no longer beneﬁtf r o mh i g h e r
rental rates of capital (the latter being ﬁxed at the benchmark level). International
factor mobility is thus of great importance for the distributional consequences of the
tax reforms we analysed.
There are various aspects missing from our modelling framework that are po-
tentially important when we assess the prominent role of tax progression in our tax
policy reforms: (1) An endogenous decision on working hours may substantially re-
duce or even invert the employment eﬀects of tax progression (see Sørensen 1999,
Fuest and Huber 2000). (2) Taxation has a strong impact on the attractiveness
of the informal sector. Black market work that contributes to oﬃcial unemploy-
ment becomes more attractive the higher the marginal labour income tax rates are.
(3) Taxation aﬀects endogenous decisions about human capital (Fuest and Huber
1998), which in turn feed back to the level of unemployment. (4) As compared to
skill groups in labour markets with collective wage bargaining, tax policies might
work quite diﬀerently for the segment of the highest skilled workers in competitive
labour markets.
We plan to address these issues in future research developing the current model
to the extent possible with the available data.
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33I Appendix : Calibrated Share Form
Numerical calculation of an economic equilibrium requires the choice of concrete
functional forms for production possibilities and preferences. In applied modelling,
nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions (including Leontief- or
Cobb-Douglas-speciﬁcations as subcases) are most common. Such functions have
certain mathematical properties (regularity) that ease the numerical analysis con-
siderably, but are still ﬂexible enough to allow for an appropriate representation
of economic behaviour. CES functions are often written in coeﬃcient form, which
requires inverting demand functions to calculate free parameters from a given set
of benchmark prices and quantities. The so-called calibrated share form, which is
equivalent to the coeﬃcient form (see Böhringer, Rutherford and Wiegard 2003),
eases the calculation of free parameters, since it is based on value shares that can be
directly read of from benchmark data without inverting the function. For example,














































 := output quantity,
 := benchmark value share of 5 in the production of 
5 := input factor,
	 := cost of 
" := input price of 5
 := elasticity of substitution.
34II Appendix : Model Parameterisation
This appendix lays out the parameterisation of our generic model described in Sec-
tion 2 to German data.
II.1 Data sources
Our main data source is the input-output table (IOT) provided by the Federal Sta-
tistical Oﬃce of Germany for the benchmark year 1995, which contains a consistent
data set of economic transactions for 59 sectors. Furthermore, we use complemen-
tary data from the employment statistics register and a sample of it (IABS), the
Bundesbank (balance sheet data), and the federal government (tax statistics).
II.2 Aggregation level
For the sake of reduced dimensionality, we have aggregated the production side of
the economy to seven sectors (see Table 5). The NACE sections A to P include all
sectors of the German IOT.
Sectors in model Single industries*
Agriculture Agriculture (A), Fishing (B)
Energy & Mining Mining (C), Electricity (E)
Manufacturing Manufacturing (D)
Construction Construction (F)
Trade & Transport Wholesale and retail trade (G), Transport (I)
Banking Financial Intermediation (J), Real estate (K)
Other Services Public administration (L), Education (M),
Health (N), Other community activities (O),
Hotels and restaurants (H), Private Households (P)
* Letters in parentheses indicate NACE-Code (section)
Table 5: Sectoral Aggregation
35II.3 Parameters
Table 6 provides a list of key model parameters. In the remainder of this section, we





 benchmark shares of factors that contribute to value added

 elasticity of substitution (EOS) in production
 price mark-up
	
 EOS between leisure and consumption
 EOS between consumption goods
+ separation rate
$¯  replacement ratio in benchmark
¯ & benchmark unemployment
 elasticity of transformation
between production for domestic markets and exports





 value shares of savings and current utility

	
 value share of leisure and consumption
Table 6: Model Parameters
II.3.1 Cost shares of production factors and mark-up rates
The German IOT provides a decomposition of total value-added into remuneration
of capital and labour. For our model parameterisation, we must disaggregate the re-
spective values into capital services and proﬁts on the one hand, and labour incomes
of the two skill groups on the other. To quantify proﬁts, we use the German Federal
Bank’s (Bundesbank, 1999) publication on annual accounts of West-German enter-
prises. We take the proﬁt per Euro of sales ratio (before tax) to measure proﬁts.
Expenses for capital services are calculated as the diﬀerence between total capital
earnings and proﬁts. Mark-up rates result as the ratio of proﬁts over sales. To di-
vide the total amount of labour earnings per sector into income of high-skilled and
36low-skilled workers, we employ data from the employment register (Beschäftigtensta-
tistik). This database covers all employees holding a regular job, i.e. those who have
to pay social security contributions. An employee without a vocational or academic
degree is treated as “unskilled”.
II.3.2 Elasticity of substitution in production
Our main reference for elasticities of substitution in German production is Falk and
Koebel (1997), who provide estimates for ﬁve aggregated sectors. Complementary
information on factor price elasticities are taken from Buslei and Steiner (1999). Falk
and Koebel (1997) treat capital as a ﬂexible factor of production, whereas Buslei
and Steiner (1999) treat it as quasi-ﬁxed. Both papers use similar data, aggregation,
however, diﬀers between the two. Table 7 summarises the uncompensated price
elasticities for labour demand that underlie our model simulations.
Industry 7 7 7 7
Agriculture -0.50 -0.17 0.15 0.02
E n e r g y&M i n i n g -0.21 -0.11 0.08 0.01
Manufacturing -1.04 -0.57 0.45 0.08
Construction -0.88 -0.07 0.60 0.05
Trade & Transport -0.22 -0.16 0.02 0.00
Banking -0.75 -0.13 0.18 0.01
Other Services -0.49 -0.11 0.34 0.03
Table 7: Labour Demand Elasticities
II.3.3 Calibration of ' 	
 and 

T h er a t i ob e t w e e nt h et o t a lt i m ee n d o w m e n ta n dt h et i m ew o r k e di nt h eb e n c h m a r k
as well as the elasticities of substitution 	
 and 
 within the utility function can not
be observed or estimated directly. However, these parameters can be inferred from
empirical estimates of the uncompensated elasticity of savings with respect to the
interest rate, 8 the uncompensated elasticity of labour supply with respect to the
37net wage, 9 and with respect to total income, 9 Using the demand equations of
Section 2.2, the following relationship between the uncompensated savings elasticity
and the elasticity of substitution between current consumption and savings applies







We set the elasticity of savings with respect to the interest rate equal to 0.4 (see
Bernheim 2001).
The relationship between the uncompensated labour supply elasticity and the
elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption is more involved. In our
concrete model, labour supply is a complex function of not only  the price of
leisure, but also all the  and $ Moreover, these variables are not independent of
one another, but linked through equilibrium constraints. We assume that all ˜ $
and  change by the same amount and match the household’s reaction on this
change with the empirical labour supply elasticity. In line with Rutherford (1995),
































































Using the benchmark values and solving for 	 we obtain

	 =
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We ﬁrst determine ' by (53) and then 	 by (52) (see Ballard, 2000). By default, the
uncompensated wage elasticity and the total income elasticity of labour supply are
set at 0.15 and -0.19, respectively, which reﬂects empirical evidence (see e.g. Borjas,
2000, p. 47).
II.3.4 Calibration of )
For each sector, we take the two FOC of the Nash bargain, evaluate them at the
benchmark, and numerically solve for the ) so that benchmark unemployment is
met.
II.3.5 Unemployment and separation rates
The overall unemployment rate is taken from oﬃcial statistics of the Federal Em-
ployment Oﬃce (Arbeitsamt). The rate for the unskilled workers is based on own
calculations using the German Microcensus (Mikrozensus). Separation rates are com-
puted from the IAB-Employee sample (IABS), which is a one per cent sample of the
complete employment register data. They are deﬁned as outﬂows into unemploy-
ment within one year over the number of employees in the middle of the same year.
For the numerical simulations, we take a 5-year average (1991-1995).
II.3.6 Income tax rates and replacement ratio
The main sources for income taxes are the tax revenue statistics of the Federal
Ministry of Finance (BMF, 2000). In order to decompose overall tax revenues into
contributions of diﬀerent agents and sectors, the following approach has been used:
• Labour income tax: We assume that both representative worker households
consist of a married couple with one bread-winner and one child. Both the
39average and the marginal wage tax of such a household (at the average income
per skill type) are reported in oﬃcial tax tables (Bundesminister der Finanzen
1992). We employ the ratio between average tax rates for low-skilled and high-
skilled workers and the coeﬃcient of residual income progression (CRIP). The
actual tax rates used in the model are then calculated such that the oﬃcially
reported tax revenue is reproduced. Marginal rates are adjusted so as to keep
the CRIP for both types.
• Capital income tax: We model a dual income tax, which treats incomes from
diﬀerent sources diﬀerently. To determine the average tax burden on capital,
we sum up the revenue of the interest tax and the non-assessed income tax and
add a small part of the assessed income tax according to information given by
federal authorities (BMF, 2000, p. 32).
• Tax on proﬁts: All other taxes levied on companies are treated as a proﬁtt a x .
They include the corporate tax and parts of personal income taxation.
As to the replacement ratio, we follow the speciﬁcation of the unemployment insur-
ance system, which amounts to 67% of the last net earnings for a married person
with one child. In our model simulations, we have ﬁxed the unemployment beneﬁts
relative to the net wage.
II.3.7 Wage diﬀerentials
Wage diﬀerentials are estimated using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP Group 2001). We pool observations from ﬁve waves in the 1990s and estimate
wage equations, including industry dummies. Table 8 reports on the estimated wage
diﬀerentials. Wages in the lowest wage sector are normalised to one.
Other approaches that are based on more comprehensive data apply panel esti-
mators to determine inter-industry wage diﬀerentials (Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt
1999) or are even able to exploit matched data sets that include information on
the employer as well as the employee (see e.g. Abowd et al. 1999). Both ways tend
to reduce the estimates, since they can take additional heterogeneity into account.
40Industry Wage (relative to lowest)
skilled unskilled
Agriculture 1.000 1.000
Energy & Mining 1.288 1.279
Manufacturing 1.212 1.201
Construction 1.226 1.226
Trade & Transport 1.077 1.062
Banking 1.215 1.204
Other Services 1.040 1.022
Table 8: Wage Diﬀerentials
The latter approach (matched employer-employee data) even eliminates almost all
diﬀerentials.
The empirical estimates of German wage diﬀerentials are too large to be used
in their raw form in the arbitrage calculus of the unemployed workers. We observe
small sectors with very low wages (hotel industry, private services), which means
that a large part of the economy must have high unemployment to make the unem-
ployed indiﬀerent between all sectors. The arbitrage condition cannot be balanced
in this way by the actual unemployment rates for Germany. We therefore include
a nonpecuniary wage component for employment in each sector in the value equa-
tion for .(see 2.3.2) The sector-speciﬁc nonpecuniary wage component can be
conceived of as hypothetical payments that make low wage sectors more attrac-
tive than solely reﬂected in their wage. To maintain homogeneity, the nonpecuniary
wage components 6 are expressed as a ﬁxed fraction of the wage, i.e. ˜  becomes
˜ (1 + 6) Thus, we have a dual account for sectoral wage diﬀerences. They are
partly attributed to non-pecuniary diﬀerences between the sectors (which reﬂects
the empirical long-term stability of wage diﬀerentials) and partly to diﬀerences in
labour market tightness.
41II.3.8 Others
Armington elasticities are taken from Welsch (2001). They range between 0 and 2.
Services and the construction sector are treated as non-tradables.
The elasticity of transformation between domestically supplied and exported
g o o d si su n i f o r m l ys e tt o2 .
The depreciation rate of the capital stock (in our case: 4.76 %) is derived us-
ing information from the Federal Statistical Oﬃce on the net value of capital and
depreciation in 1995.
Savings equal total investment, which is the sum of all expenditures on invest-
ment good in the benchmark period. To split up total savings between the two
representative households, information from continuous household budget surveys is
employed (Statistisches Bundesamt 1995).
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